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ABSTRA'T
U.S. Foreign Military Sales to ROC in Taiwan have always
been a controversial matter, and the United States has often
yielded to the pressure from Communist China. The Taiwan
Relations Act was designed by Congress to provide adequate
safeguards for the well-being of Taiwan. But the law is too
flexible for implementation to be effective, and effectiveness
seems to rest largely on the good faith of the executive
office. The strategic location of Taiwan has great
significance for U.S. strategic political and economic
interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Gen. Douglas
MacArthur described the island as an "Unsinkable Aircraft
Carrier." As the security of Taiwan is intimately linked to
the overall security of the Pacific Area. U.S. defense
technology transfer is of prime importance to help Taiwan
upgrade their defense capability for protecting the sky and
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The United States, a well-developed democratic country with
vast territory and rich resources, has been the largest
supplier of conventional arms in the 20th century. Especially
during World War II, when the well-known Lend Lease Act of
1941 was committed to be the "Arsenal of Democracy". Under
this Act, the United States provided $48.5 billion in defense
articles to assist her allies to fight against the Axis powers
in Europe and Asia-, Ref. l:p. 7)
After the Axis powers were defeated and the victorious
Allies began drawing apart, the Soviet army remained in
Europe, setting up subservient puppet regimes to buffer the
Soviet Union from Western Europe. While in Asia, the Soviets
seized China's sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, occupied Japan's
northern Kuril Archipelago and created North Korea. Moreover,
the Chinese Communists, with the material help of the Soviets,
conspired and occupied the Chinese Mainland. Out of these
actions emerged Stalin's Communist Empire. Since then, the
world has developed into a sharp confrontation between free
nations and totalitarian Communists.
In order to confront the Soviet threat, the free and
democratic bloc of nations, headed by the United States, uses
economic and military aid to help other nations strengthen
defenses against foreign encroachment. The Communist bloc
nations impose their political system upon the under-developed
and developing countries by using economic strangulation and
subversion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a
system of "Bulwark of Anti-Communism" was established by 12
Western nations in 1950 to provide for a collective defense
against a possible attack by the Soviets. On the Communist
side, the Warsaw Pact of 1955 was signed when the Soviets
tried to tighten control over the Eastern Communist regimes.
Similarly, there are various bilateral and multilateral
treaties or agreements between the United States and the Far
Eastern countries in the Pacific Rim to prevent the spread of
Communism in that part of the world.
The government of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was forced
to move its seat to Taiwan in 1949, creating a severe danger
which continues to threaten Taiwan. The United States
indicated it did not wish to become involved in the situation
and announced publicly that it would no longer provide
military aid to the R.O.C. [Ref. 2:p. 119]. When the Korean
War broke out, the no-interference policy was quickly
reversed. In late June, 1950, the United States ordered the
Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan. In 1954, the
Mutual Defense Treaty was signed between the United States and
R.O.C. Unfortunately, owing to the complicated world
situation, the United States decided to play its "China Card"
to counterbalance the Soviet threat. In 1979 the United States
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broke formal relations with R.O.C. and established diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). The
Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated accordingly.
Upon ending diplomatic relations with R.O.C., the American
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and
stated that the United States "will make available to Taiwan
such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-
defense capability [Ref 2:p. 68)." Chinese Communists reacted
by saying that military force would be used to liberate Taiwan
and warned Washington that if the United States continued to
sell arms to Taiwan, the relations with Washington would be
hindered and downgraded. The U.S. government was compelled to
issue a U.S.-Communist China Joint Communique in 1982 which
clearly declares:
The United States Government does not seek to carry
out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan and will
not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative
terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
United States and China, and that it intends to reduce
gradually its sale of arms to -,an leading over a
period of time to a final resolution. (Ref. 2:p. 88)
Under this China policy, the important question was how the
R.O.C. could maintain its security under the TRA.
Since their seizure of the mainland, the Chinese Communists
have regarded the island bastion of Taiwan as a thorn in their
back which must be removed. But, the Taiwan Straits is a
natural barrier between mainland China and Taiwan. Mainland
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China needs time to- build up its military capability to
achieve the invasion goal.
On September 3, 1956, the Chinese Communists unsuccessfully
tried to occupy the offshore Island Kinmen near the mainland
coast. On August 23, 1958, they resumed shelling the island
and conducted landing operations. The Communist's military
operation to attempt the capture of the island was checked by
the National Forces and it failed with heavy losses.
Today, the picture is quite different from that in the
1950s. Although the natural barrier still provides some
protection to-Taiwan, the Red's military strength is growing.
The Red's navy has reached a strength beyond that required for
protection of its merchant marine in time of war. It has more
submarines than needed for home defense.
History teaches a clear lesson. Aggressive conduct, if
allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads
to war. Frequent military maneuvers by the Reds along the
Taiwan Straits have proven that the Chinese Communists have
never given up their attempt to invade Taiwan. Therefore it is
absolutely necessary for the R.O.C. to have a strong defense
system to maintain its security.
After World War II, South Korea and R.O.C. were the only
countries in the Far East to remain split. The Korean Defense
Minister, Lee Sang-Hoon, lately reported to President Roh that
South Korea would develop its own modern weaponry and increase
milita-y research to cope with the reduction of U.S. troops.
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Taiwan's situation is not comparable as it has no U.S. troops
stationed on the island. This means that the R.O.C. government
should improve its military strength so as to have sufficient
and reliable deterrent capabilities.
The 1982 Communique which imposes limits on arms sales to
Taiwan is detrimental to Taiwan's security. In the face of
this grave situation, the R.O.C. has intensified efforts to
develop and produce more of its own weapons while continuing
to seek arms from the United States. Furthermore, Taiwan has
begun its own research and development aimed at national
defense self-sufficiency. Defense technology transfers to
R.O.C. are the most suitable way for the United States to
assist R.U.C. to facilitate self-sufficient capability for
national defense. Stability in the Taiwan Strait concerns not
only the survival of Taiwan, but is also in the best interest
of the United States.
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II. REVIEW OF THE U.S. FMS
A. GENERAL
The issues of arms sales are very complex. The supplier
country has to consider many objectives, but there are two
main objectives: political and economic. The political one
outweighs the economic in importance.
The political objective of arms sales is to provide
friendly nations or allies with suitable weapons to deter
potential threats or to fight against actual foreign invasion.
The transfer of arms is expected to create or maintain a
regional balance of power fcr a stable environment in the
interest of the supplier country as well as the foreign one.
Without the threat of foreign encroachment, there would be no
need to spend a huge amount of money on arms. This creates a
tremendous burden on countries with limited resources and
urgent economic and social needs. However, until a country is
no longer endangered, it has every right to purchase weapons
it deems necessary in order to safeguard and defend its
existence.
The supplier country may seek commercial benefits or arms
sales for hard currency to pay for other necessary imports. As
a matter of fact, arms is a special kind of merchandise. The
buyer country can get it somewhere, somehow - at a price - and
6
therefore, selling arms is a commercial activity, but more
complex .
The United States has long been the world's largest
supplier of arms and has had the greatest increase in sales.
During the period of 1950-1979, it transferred abroad over
$100 billion (U.S. dollars) in arms and related military
services, more than half of the world trade. Under the Reagan
Administration, arms sales were emphasized as an instrument of
diplomacy (Ref. 3:p.45]. The complexity and comprehensive
factors involved in the determination of U.S. arms sales can
be better understood as listed in the Department of Defense
Security Assistance Management Manual [Ref. 1:p. 5].
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) support specific U.S.
foreign policy and security objectives. Historically,
sales have improved international order and increased the
prospects for regional stability, thereby reducing the
likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement.
Standardization of material, doctrine, and training is
enhanced among our allies and friends. Additional
benefits stemming from foreign military sales are: the
U.S. production base is maintained, U.S. employment is
increased, research and development costs are spread,
unit costs to the U.S. services are reduced, and forward
material support is facilitated.
As mentioned above, arms sales must be considered
essentially in political terms, no matter whether it is
political, diplomatic, commercial, or something else.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF FMS IN THE UNITED STATES
During World War II, the Soviet Union saw the opportunity
to regain the territory once ruled by the Czar, and strived
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for expansion. As a result of the War, Russia acquired (or
reacquired) large amounts of territory in Europe along its
eastern border. This acquisition of territory was passively
accepted by the Western democracies. Along its southern
border, however, the U.S.S.R. encountered resistance [Ref.
4:p. 46], i.e., the Azerbaizan Incident in Iran, the territory
disputes between Turkey and Russia, and the Communist guerilla
civil war in Greece. The United States was fully aware of the
Soviet's ambitious attempt. On March 12, 1947, President
Truman declared that the United States pledged to "support
free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressure." This declaration became well known as
the "Truman Doctrine," the turning point in American foreign
policy. A few months after President Truman announced that the
United States would give military assistance to Greece and
Turkey, Secretary of State George Marshall announced in June
1949 that the United States would make available economic
assistance to all the countries of Europe. This is known as
the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Plan. Some
historians said that 1947 was the beginning of "Cold War."
The policy of containment to provide assistance to Greece
and Turkey was the conception of the Military Assistance Grand
Aid Program at a later date. The United States foreign policy
is closely related to U.S. strategic concerns in the world.
Its ultimate objective is to prevent the spread of Communism
on a global basis. On January 12, 1950, the then-Secretary of
8
State Dean Acheson defined a "defensive perimeter" for the
United States in the Pacific, running from the Aleutian
Islands through Japan and then the Ryukyu Islands and the
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Figure 1. Secretary of State Acheson's Defensive Perimeter
I
The Soviets were much impressed by this perimeter and thus had
opportunities to explore further expansion. On June 25, 1950,
the Soviets urged North Korea to launch a massive attack on
the South. America quickly assumed the role of leading power
of the democratic world and went to war against the Communist
aggression. President Truman said,
We had been tough in Iran, Berlin and Greece, and we
must show the same toughness in Asia. Certainly, the
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"Appeasement Diplomacy" can not stop the aggression which
the British Prime Minister Chamberlain had tried to ease
the tension before the start of World War II. The past
history should have taught us this fatal lesson.
America is an extraordinary country, noted for its idealism
and willingness to sacrifice narrow national interest for
global benefits. The government of the United States realized
that what happened in other countries would affect their
security sooner or later. In view of the necessity of
preventing the Soviet from extending its sphere of influence,
the U.S. employed traditional instruments of foreign policy,
such as alliances and economic assistance. The close ties
inherent in the security relationship and strengthening the
military forces of their allies and friendly nations not only
can directly deter the Communist expansion but also enhance
the security of the United States and world peace.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the first
alliance treaty established in April 1949. Hence it
successfully ended the Soviet expansion any further in Western
Europe and the effect of this collective defense treaty was
quite obvious. As the ultimate objective of Stalinization was
to communize the free world and to bury the democratic
countries, the expansion in the Western Group met with grave
difficulty. They changed their course to Asia. In order to
counter this situation, the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO) was then organized by eight nations in
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September 1954. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
consisting of five nations was signed in February 1955.
These three treaty organizations formed the "Bulwark of
Anti-Communism," a great achievement of American policy of
containment. Furthermore, there were various bilateral and
multilateral defense pacts, security treaties between the
United States and West Pacific countries, all aimed at
preventing the spread of Communism in this part of the world.
The United States stood up as a world power in both Europe and
Asia.
Clausewitze, the well-known Prussian strategist in his 1827
treatise On War declared that "the war of a common society is
the war of all people, particularly the war between civilized
people which must be conceived in political status and
stimulated by the political motive," and that war therefore,
is "a political act." He went on further, "War is not merely
a political act but also really a political instrument, a
continuation of policy carried out by other means." This marks
the beginning of the conception of modern "Cold War." Quite
obviously there is an intimate relationship between war and
politics. The concept of Clausewitze is that politics produced
war, and war was the means to employ violence as the
continuation of politics.
The instruments of violence are armaments and armed forces.
Without arms there could be no war. International relations
are the interaction of states. There are many issues in
ii
international relations but war seems to be the ma3or one.
Vice-President Richard Nixon said in 1953, "If it were not for
the Communist threat, the free world could live in peace."
[Ref 4:p. 136]
America assumed the leadership of the democratic bloc in
countering the Communist expansion. Their consistent foreign
policy was to supply the needed arms to the threatened
country, either through a reimbursable or non-reimbursable
security assistance program.
In the 1950s security assistance consisted mainly of
surplus military stock of over-aged, technologically inferior
equipment transferred through grants in aid or loans. This
assistance was intended to support friendly foreign countries
in establishing and maintaining adequate defense postures
which were consistent with their economic stability and growth
and to help them to maintain internal security and to resist
external aggression. Basically, this was the philosophy of the
Eisenhower Doctrine. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
In August 1964, a North Vietnam torpedo boat attacked a
U.S. destroyer. Congress passed the "Tonkin Gulf Resolution"
which authorized President Johnson to formally enter the war
against North Vietnam. It was a rather unbelievable fact that,
despite being materially worse off, North Vietnam was able to
employ guerrilla tactics against modernized U.S. military
power until a ceasefire in January 1973. The withdrawal of
American troops in March 1973 led to the collapse of South
12
Vietnam in 1975.. The long-time military engagement in Vietnam
had brought about tremendously evil effects on both the
economic welfare and social community in the United States.
When President Nixon was elected in 1969, U.S. commitment
of troops in Vietnam was at the peak of 545,000 Americans.
During that period, anti-Vietnam War campaigns created a
regular furor throughout most American cities. The American
foreign policy seemed to change from a policy of containment
to "From Confrontation to Negotiation" (Ref. 6:p. 595]. The
United States and the Soviet Union moved closer in a process
called "detente." The term "detente" (Ref. 4:p. 420) has been
frequently used since that time. The long and bloody Vietnam
War was terminated during Nixon's term.
After two hot wars in Korea and Vietnam, America's economic
strength began to decline. However, some European countries
and Japanese economies had begun to recover. A sense of
economic contraction thus began to reduce the scope of
American military power.
President Nixon, in remarks on Guam during a world trip in
1969, suggested that henceforward the United States would
supply arms but not soldiers. The "Nixon Doctrine," as it was
called, has been followed by Nixon's successors as well, with
United States arms transfers remaining high but with United
States troops by and large being kept out of military
engagements since the Vietnam War ended. [Ref 4 :p. 459)
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The economic position of the United States continued to
weaken until 1971 when it ran its first trade deficit since
before World War II [Ref. 4:p. 512). Although the United
States was still heavily involved with security assistance,
during the Nixon and Ford years the emphasis shifted from
Military Assistance Programs (MAP) and Grant Aid to Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) [Ref. 5:p. 5). Since then, the arms
transfers have become predominantly sales rather than grants.
Figure 2 shows the United States arms sales between 1970
and 1980. The amounts cited as sales include not only weapons
but supporting equipment, spare parts, and services such as
construction and training (these could amount to as much as
40% of the total package). Military assistance grants, as
opposed to sales, declined from less than $2 billion in 1970
to a mere $265,000 in 1976. To many critics, arms sales
policies under the Nixon and Ford Administrations had gotten
out of control. Indeed, it often seemed as if there was no
coherent arms transfer policy at all. [Ref. 3:p. 46)
One of the important legislations regarding the Foreign
Military Sales Program that should be mentioned here is the
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act
of 1976 (AECA). In general, the AECA defines the statutory
purpose for sales ofdefense articles and defense service to
allies and friendly foreign governments in accordance with the
restraints and controls specified and for furtherance of the
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Figure 2. United States Arms Sales, 1970-1980
AECA prohibits transfers to any ciuntry "which engages in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights" except in extraordinary
circumstances.
The Act requires that the president make an annual country-
by-country evaluation for the Congress on human rights
conditions to aid it in making judgements on security
assistance. Since then, human rights have became one of the
major criteria for applying arms sales project.
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The International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act which has been amended annually since 1976 was the
most significant piece ,of legislation dealing with arms
transfers since the enactment of the Mutual Security Act more
than a quarter of a century earlier. It sought to "shift the
focus of U.S. arms sales policy from that of selling arms to
controlling arms sales and export." (Ref. 3:p. 50]
The excesses of American arms sales were the source of much
unease. America became the "Arms Merchant of the World" or
"Arsenal for the World" (Ref. 3:p. 45]. Through this Act,
Congress secured its role in dealing with the process of arms
transfers and gave voice to its continuing interest in
restraints.
The Carter administration's policy on arms transfer was one
of restraint. He pledged: "Henceforth arms transfers were to
be viewed as an exceptional foreign policy instrument, to be
used on- .i instances where it can be clearly demonstrated
that the transfer contributes to our national security
interests." [Ref. 3:p. 52]
To implement the policy, a set of qualitative and
quantitative controls was established. In addition, the human
rights within recipient countries would be a consideration in
future security assistance programs. Finally, there was to be
a dollar ceiling on the volume of new commitments for foreign
military sales and military assistance programs, with the
16
total for fiscal year 1978 to be less than the previous year
[Ref. 3:p. 53].
The following are six provisions which served as guidelines
for Foreign Military Sales:
1. The United States would not be the first supplier to
introduce into a region newly developed, advanced
weapons systems that would create a new or
significantly higher combat capability.
2. The United States would not sell .newly developed
advanced weapons systems until they were
operationally deployed with U.S. forces.
3. The United States would not permit development or
significant modification of advanced weapons systems
solely for export.
4. The United States would not permit co-production
agreements with other countries for significant
weapons, equipment, and major components.
5. The United States would not allow U.S. weapons or
equipment to be transferred to third parties without
U.S. government consent.
6. The United States would require policy-level
authorization by the Department of State for actions
by agents of the United States or private
manufacturers that might promote the sale of arms
abroad.
The above restrictive guidelines were not to apply to
transfers to countries with which the United States has major
defense treaties - NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
Carter's policy was motivated by idealism and the
difficulty of regulating the flow of arms sales in practice.
Figure 2 clearly shows that the reality of arms sales under
the Carter Administration increased overall. It was an
ambitious policy, comprehensive in scope and detail. A country
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requesting arms sales would could be carefully considered and
scrutinized for their full implications.
The Reagan Administration's approach toward arms sales
exemplified a major differences between its foreign policy and
that of preceding administrations. The Reagan Administration
viewed the transfer of conventional arms as an essential
element of the U.S. global defense posture and an
indispensable component of foreign policy (Ref. 3:p. 62).
The Reagan Administration also increased military spending
and support for insurgents against Communist governments. The
-press labeled such support as "the Reagan Doctrine" (Ref. 4:p.
459). The Reagan Doctrine could be seen as the application of
the Nixon Doctrine to covert action, that is, letting others
do the fighting while the United States supplied the material
(Ref. 4 :p. 460].
It seems clear that the Reagan Administration was relaxing
the arms sales control which had been imposed by the previous
administration, and face up to the realities of Soviet
aggrandizement with a sober, balanced, and responsible arms
transfer policy to protect the interest of the U.S. national
security.
The United States went through two World Wars plus the Cold
War. It goes without saying that if America did not supply
huge amount of arms or enter wars, the world situation would
be much different and all the free people would be living in
a miserable world. A leading East German psychiatrist said
18
that 40 years of hard-line communist rule had made many of the
country's people mentally ill. The ailments range from sadness
to "murderous anger and hatred (Ref. 7:p. 2)."
America is an extraordinary country with traditional unique
thought as specified in its Declaration of Independence: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain
inalienable rights, that among those are LIFE, LIBERTY, and
the pursuit of HAPPINESS."
President Truman announced that the United States would
assist "free people everywhere." Though the Truman Doctrine
was seen by the free world as a program to prevent Soviet
interference in Greece and Turkey it was motivated by the
traditional idealism which can be seen further in President
Kennedy's ideas about international relations.
President Kennedy expressed the same American sense of
mission when he said, "Let every nation know, whether it
wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe
to assure the survival and success of liberty [Ref. 8:p. 16)."
In his inaugural address, he declared that a new generation of
Americans was "unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing
of those human rights to which this nation has always been
committed, and to which we are committed today at home and
around the world." For Americans, these human rights were,
above all, the civil liberties enumerated by the first 10
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amendments to the United States Constitution, and particularly
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, from torture, and
from summary execution [Ref. 4:p. 454]. Since then, human
rights is the primary concern of American foreign policy.
In view of the complexity and diversity in the evolution
and implementation of the United States Security Assistance
Programs, this study tries to draw out a clear and concise
picture regarding the FMS by looking at historical background
after World War II. The following is a brief summary for easy
grasping about FMS.
1. U.S. Security Astistance Programs fall into three
general categories: Support Assistance, Military
Assistance Program (MAP),and Foreign Military Sales
(FMS).Of the three, two are completely military in
nature, i.e., the MAP and FMS programs, which are
under Defense Department administration, in
coordination with the Departmeivt of State. MAP
involves no cost to the recipient country, whereas
FMS are sales for cash or credit repayable in U.S.
dollars within 12 years [Ref. 5: p. 10].
2., FMS and other elements of the Security Assistance
Programs are the effective instrument of global
defense picture and indispensable component of U.S.
foreign policy which can be seen from the statement
made before the House Committee on International
Affairs by William P. Clements, Deputy Secretary on
11 November 1975. The statement reads as:
The principal purpotie of Security Assistance ... both the
grant aid and the Military Sales Programs ... is to
strengthen deterrence and promote peaceful resolution of
international issues by helping our friends and allies to
maintain adequate defense forces of their own. ... If we
achieve regional stability in crucial areas of the world
without the need for direct intervention by American
forces, then, our security assistance efforts have ben
rewarded.
Even five years later, 19 January 1981, Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown reported to the Congress that at
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the end of 1980 approximately 99 countries and three
international organizations were authorized to
participate in FMS and revitalized the necessity of
this program, he declared:
"Security assistance will continue to play an important
role in assisting friends and allies in meeting their
essential defense requirements for the foreseeable future
.... The more likely scenario is that these programs will
expand to meet changing international security
requirements .... " [Ref. 5:p. 123
3. FMS are authorized only when the sales best serve the
national defense and foreign policy interests of the
United States and to ensure that other free and
independent countries with valid requirements for
effective and mutually beneficial defense relations
are encouraged to maintain and foster an environment
of international peace and security.
Finally, it should be reemphasized that arms sales must be
considered essentially in political terms. In the arena of
foreign policy, DoD alone cannot decide whether or not a sale
is in the national interest. The mission of the DoD concerning
FMS is judicious sales of defense articles and services and
supporting the foreign policy of the United States. Therefore,
all transactions must be approved by the Department of State.
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III. THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
AND U.S. ARMS SALES
A. GENERAL
Facing its long-time adversary, the ROC has experienced
economic, social, and political progress unmatched almost
anywhere in the developing countries over the past 40 years.
Although under military threat from Communist China, the ROC
government has firmly vowed to stay in the democratic camp and
has refused any possibility of entanglements with any
communist regime since the Carter Administration terminated
its formal relations with ROC in 1978. In considering the
strategic picture in East Asia, a secure and prosperous
government in Taiwan coincides with the interests of the
United States, Japan, Western Europe, the Republic of Korea,
and ASEAN countries.
However, with its limited resources and defense technology,
the ROC will be in a difficult position to maintain a credible
military deterrent sufficient to discourage any military
action by Chinese Communists by the end of the 20th century
when Peiping plans to accomplish its military modernization.
The Island's military strength will not be able to serve as an
effective regional force to monitor and help control Soviet
naval and air activities in the face of Moscow's growing
military buildup in the Western Pacific. So the U.S. policy of
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arms sales to Taiwan is very important for the defense needs
of ROC.
B. THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
With the rapprochement between the United States and
Communist China since early 1970, the strategic value of
Taiwan to the free world has been largely forgotten. Indeed,
the strategic importance of the Island is much greater than is
generally recognized in the United States.
During the Korean War in the 1950s, General Douglas
MacArthur emphasized repeatedly that defending the Island was
very important to American interests. He compared the ROC to
an unsinkable aircraft carrier that could never be replaced by
any existing U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. In a speech to the
U.S. Congress following his dismissal, General MacArthur
expressed the extreme view that the loss of the Island might
force U.S. western frontiers back to the coasts of California,
Oregon, Washington.
Geographically, Taiwan is located in the outer edge of the
East Asia continent, and occupies the central position of the
island-chain-defense of the Western Pacific (Figure 3). It is
the pivotal point in the sea line communications of Japan and
the Republic of Korea. Almost all of the crude oil and raw
materials needed by Japan and by Korea must be shipped through
the peripheral waters off Taiwan. Thus, the strategic location








Figure. sad-bi defense of the Western Pacific
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This has been especially true since the Soviet occupation of
Cam-Ranh Bay, Vietnam.
Undoubtedly, the Soviet military expansion in East Asia
adds a new dimension seriously jeopardizing the military
balance and security in this part of the world. However,
Taiwan controls both the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel,
through Which the Soviet Far East fleet must pass from
Vladivostock to Cam Ranh Bay. Therefore, the island can
severely limit the effectiveness of the Soviet's sea power.
Moreover, with excellent air bases, sea ports and an extensive
industrial base, Taiwan is capable of supporting and
substantially reinforcing air and sea operations in the
Western Pacific. In other words, the stability of the ROC
means the security and safety of the West Pacific Ocean. If
Taiwan should be occupied by the Communists or other
unfriendly power, the chain of defense in the West Pacific
Ocean would collapse like dominoes [Ref. 9:pp. 5-6].
The economic performance of the ROC over the past 40 years
has been an international miracle. The trade records last year
made the ROC the 12th largest trading country in the world
[Ref. 10:p 70). As for its future economic development,
several factors are beneficial to the ROC: a well-educated
work force; the rapid development of a strong defense
industry; a stable environment of promoting both public and
private investment, and offering more incentives for foreign
investment. In short, the ROC is in a unique position not only
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to deter the expansion of communism in the West Pacific, but
also to contribute its efforts to developing democratic
politics.
C. COMMUNIST CHINA'S CURRENT STRATAGEMAGAINST THE ROC
It is very clear that Communist China has never ruled out
its intention to gain control of ROC. Since 1949 there have
been four major attempts by Peiping's leaders to try to gain
political control over the ROC. The four stages of political
control in the ROC are:
1. 1949-1954 Armed Liberation of Taiwan
2. 1955-1971 Peaceful Liberation
3. 1972-1979 Isolation of Taiwan
4. 1980-Now Peaceful reunification
Prior to the normalization of relations with the United
States, Communist China publicly announced that military
forces would be used to achieve the so-called reunification.
According to the People's Daily of 20 December 1987, Ten
Hsiao-ping raised the so-called one-country/two-systems
proposal which allows Taipei to maintain its armed forces and
even its unofficial ties with foreign countries. It is obvious
that Peiping has tried to create a false image of peaceful
reunification. The attempts behind its mask are to isolate the
ROC; in particular to persuade the U.S. administration to stop
arms sales to Taipei and to weaken the anti-communist
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determination of the ROC. Peiping's ultimate goal is to
communize the Island, a goal which they have never abandoned.
Although the United States has committed itself to the
security of Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act, Peiping
has warned that it would downgrade its relations with
Washington if the United States continues to sell weapons to
the ROC. In December 1980, Peiping threatened the Reagan
Administration in a manner similar to the reduction of the
Hague's representation to the level of charge d'affaires as a
result of the decision by the Dutch to sell two Swordfish-
class submarines to the ROC. In response to Peiping, on August
17, 1982, the Reagan Administration felt compelled to issue a
U.S.-Communist China Joint Communique that gave the appearance
of a readiness to restrict U.S. arms sales to the ROC to both
a specific dollar ceiling and a qualitative level with the
apparent ultimate intention of terminating such sales entirely
at some unspecified time.
Peiping is also trying to undermine the ROC's diplomatic
status in the international community. Peiping has designed to
portray the ROC as a local government that needs to be
reintegrated with the mainland as soon as possible. In
summary, diplomatic isolation, economic pressures, and
psychological warfare on a thousand fronts are all part of
Peiping's current indirect stratagem against the ROC and its
efforts to force the ROC into a reconciliation on communist
terms.
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D. REINFORCE NAVAL STRENGTH, CORNERSTONE OF TAIWAN'S SECURITY
When examining the ROC's long-term threat from Communist
China and the increasing Soviet military buildup in the
Pacific Area, however, ROC defense capabilities are marginal
and need to be considerably enhanced. (Almost all the ROC's
ships and aircraft were received from the United States. Many
had been in service by the United States Navy since World War
II. Even with proper maintenance, rebuilding and
modernization, the ships will need to be retired soon.)
Despite the fact that the ROC is currently giving priority to
speeding up its own defense industry and is looking for
additional sources of supply for advanced weapons, the United
States is still and will continue to be the major arms
supplier to Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Relations Act in
Section 2(b) and Section 3:
Section 2.
(b) It is the policy of the United States -
(1) ....
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are
in the political security, and economic interests of the
United States, and are matters of international concerns;
(3) ..........(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security
of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of defensive nature; and(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to
resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
Section 3.
(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in Section 2
of this Act, the United States will make available to
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
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quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
a sufficient self-defense capability.
(b) the President and Congress shall determine the nature
and quantity of such defense articles and services based
solely upon their judgement of the needs of Taiwan, in
accordance with procedures established by law. Such
determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include
review by United States military authorities in
connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.
(c) The president is directed to inform the congress
promptly of any threat the security or the social or
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to
the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The
President and Congress shall determine, in accordance
with constitutional process, appropriate action by the
United States in response to any such danger.
In other words, the United States will make available to
Taiwan defense articles and defense services in such quantity
as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defe- - capability. The United States has continued to
sell weapons to the ROC. And the volume of arms sales (Table
I) showed the U.S. willingness to carry out its promise toward
the ROC.
The United States provided about $5.2 billion in grants or
sales from 1950 to the end of 1979. As grant assistance ends,
all arms transfers must be made by FMS. From Table I it is
worthwhile to mention here that the values of commercial sales
have grown significantly and the total values decrease yearly.
But the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has had
significant changes in recent years. With its rapid
development of high performance fighters, such as the F-8, F-
10 and F-12 Communist China will be capable of taking air
superiority over the Taiwan Straits by the end of the 20th
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TABLE I. VALUE O U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN (IN MILLIONS
OF U.S. $)
FISCAL YEAR- FMS COMMERCIAL EXPORTS TOTAL
1979 598 - 598
1980 287 - 287
1981 295 - 295
1982 f600 - 600
1983 698.6 85 783.6
1984 688.7 70 758.7
1985 700.4 54.5 754.9
1986 510.8 228.4 739.2
1987 509.6 210.0 719.6
1988 - - -
1989 495 185 680*
1990 - ceiling 660*
Jane's Defense Weekly. 6 January 1990. p. 35.
century. In addition, at least 10 air bases on the Chinese
Mainland are within a 250-nautical mile operational radius
from Taiwan. Should Communist China mount an offensive against
the Island, each field could serve and support an estimated
150 combat aircraft or a total of roughly 1,500. Undoubtedly,
all those aircraft which don't include those deployed at the
northern China, will threaten directly the security of the ROC
which presently has less than 400 fighters, mostly composed of
F-104s, F-100s, F-5A/Bs and F-5Es.
Taiwan also faces a tremendous threat from Communist
China's navy. This threat can be divided into three
components: surface fighting vessels, submarines, and
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amphibious ships. Among them, what the ROC navy is most
concerned is Communist China's surface fleet, particularly the
vast missile boat fleet and large submarine inventory. Of all
the threats from sea, perhaps the most serious is the possible
blockade by submarines which would smother the Island's
economic development. The ROC's current surface fleet is at a
distinct disadvantage against both the surface and submarine
fleet of the Communist China.
After reviewing the current military situation, the primary
operation of the Republic of China will be to retain air
superiority over the Taiwan Strait under all possible attack,
and to maintain the sea line off Taiwan Strait.
Ships in the ROC's current force consist of platforms
received from the United States after World War II. Therefore,
the age of the ships and weapon systems are rendering them
obsolete as defense platforms. Despite intensive maintenance
on its aging force, these ships need to be replaced by a
second generation.
It's difficult to get new jet-fighter and war-ship
technologies because of: 1) A lack of formal diplomatic
relations with countries that process the needed technology,
and 2) Communist China uses its diplomatic influence to block
technology transfer.
After several years of ship-building experience and
economic progress, ROC plans to develop its self-sustaining
defense industry so that it will not need to rely on foreign
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influences to upgrade its defense forces. This will be
accomplished by introducing U.S. ship-building technology.
Theproject can enhance the ROC's national defense industry
by training designers and engineers in the latest design
methods so that future warships can be designed in the ROC.
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IV. CULTIVATION OF NAVAL SHIP DESIGN
A. GENERAL
The ROC Armed Forces have been generously equipped by the
United States for many years. After the normalization of
relations between Washington and Peking at the end of 1978, a
serious situation was created for Taiwan. Arms sales have been
a problem because the Agreement signed between the United
States and P.R.C. in August 1982 clearly indicated that the
U.S. would reduce arms sales to Taiwan with the eventual
purpose of totally ending those sales. Nobody can predict with
certainty when and how the arms sales to R.O.C. will be
terminated.
Realizing this crisis, the ROC government decided to
increase military expenditures and develop its own defense
industry in order to fulfill self-sufficiency and reduce
dependence upon procurement abroad. The development of the IDF
"Ching Kue" jet fighter was carried out successfully. The M48H
tank unveiled on April 14, 1990, and christened "Brave Tiger"
was jointly developed by the Armor Research and Development
Center and a U.S. firm, General Dynamics Co. It took seven
years of research and is now in production. The tank is
regarded as more sophisticated than the U.S.-made BGOA3.
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According, to official reports, about 450 tanks will be
produced.
Although research and development programs for these major
military weapons have been accomplished, the naval combatant
vessel, FFG program, is just at the starting stage. CSBC will
undertake the construction. The complete design was purchased
through U.S.F.M.S. Technical Data Package (TDP). The
construction is launched in cooperation with the U.S. Bath
Iron Works Shipyard (BIW) which provides both technical and
procurement support service in order to facilitate the
construction and deliver the vessels to the Navy on schedule.
B. TAIWAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Before World War II, there was only one full-sized shipyard
in Taiwan which was located in Keelung, in the northern part
of Taiwan. After rehabilitation, it became Taiwan Shipbuilding
Corporation (TSBC), a state-owned shipyard to build small
fishing vessels. In 1957, TSBC built four steel 350 G/T
fishing vessels under technical cooperation with Niigata
Shipyard of Japan. For further development and expansion, TSBC
was reorganized as Ingalls Taiwan Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. to be jointly operated with the U.S. Ingalls Shipbuilding
Corporation. Two 36,000 DWT tankers were constructed between
1957 and 1962.
In 1962, TSBC retrieved the management. A technical
cooperation with Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries C. Ltd.
34
(IHI) of Japan was arranged. A series of medium-size bulk
carriers and 100,000 DWT tankers were built then. By the end
of January 1978, TSBC had built various types of ships with a
total aggregated tonnage of over 2,450,000 DWT.
In 1973, another shipyard, China Shipbuilding Corporation
(CSBC) was established in Kaohsiung, in the southern part of
Taiwan, to further strengthen the national shipbuilding
capabilities. Two 445,000 DWT tanker VLCC were built in 1977
and 1978. Following the oil crisis, the world shipbuilding
industry was faced with long worldwide shipbuilding recession.
TSBC was thus merged in CSBC in the year of 1978.
CSBC has accumulated over 30 years of experience in
building various types of merchant ships and built more than
50 naval ships, including Fast Attack Boats (FAB), Troop
Transport Ships (AP) and Fleet Replenishment Vessels (AOE).
However, the design of these ships built by CSBC was mostly
purchased abroad.
For accelerating the development of domestic shipbuilding
industry, the United Ship Design and Development Center
(USDDC) was established on July 1, 1976. As of this date, 71
ships of 22 designs have been constructed with a total
aggregated deadweight of about 2,300,000 DWT.
Today, Taiwan is one of the important shipbuilding
countries in the world and ranked No. 6 in the world
shipbuilding industries [Ref. ll:p. 6].
35
C. OUTLINE OF U.S. NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION PROCESS
The United States, a seafaring nation from its inception,
relies on the world's oceans for its economic vitality and
military strength. Its maritime strategy seemed to be aimed at
defense of its territory as far from their own shores as
possible, and preparation and planning for global warfare to
be waged in conjunction with its allies. It is obvious that
the need for strong naval forces and the planning for its
employment is based on the larger, overarching requirements.
The well-known U.S."600-Ship-Navy" is the outcome of its
maritime strategy.
Generally, naval ships are required to perform specified
missions. Before acquisition, they must have an operational
analysis which includes a threat analysis or study of expected
enemy actions, methods or mode of attack, etc. From the threat
analysis it i3 determined what must be done to meet or counter
the threat. This in turn results in a state of Operational
Requirements (OR) to specify the ship's missions and tasks and
states the desired operational characteristics. The OR is then
sent to the engineering or design organization to perform the
design and construction in traditional sequence.
The American naval ship acquisition process is rather
complex and lengthy. The whole process is an extensive and
important subject which far exceed the scope of this paper.
But, a general understanding of the process recognizes the
importance of ship design in the whole process, especially the
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logic and orderly tackling the multi-year multi-million dollar
acquisition is of valuable guidance for other navies in
planning their naval ship building program.
The U.S. Navy Ship Acquisition Process involves many
personnel within Naval Sea Command (NAVSEA), other Navy
agencies and industry. NAVSEA is responsible for the ship
acquisition program. The organization of NAVSEA is shown in
Figure 4. NAVSEA 03 and 05 were merged into a single
organization 05 renamed the SHIP DESIGN AND ENGINEERING with
three major groups as shown in Figure 5. When a new ship
project arises, a project manager is designated from one of
three platforms, depending on the type of ship, as the Ship
Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) to handle the project. At
the same time, a ship design manager (SDM) is designated by
NAVSEA 05 to cope with SHAPM for the design and engineering of
the project.
It is very important for NAVSEA (SHAPM and SDM) to find out
precisely from the Tentative Operation Requirements (TOR)
issued by the Chief of Naval Operation (OPNAV) what they want
for the ship. NAVSEA first responds to the TOR with a
Development Option Paper (DOP) which is a kid of preliminary
proposal that states the feasibility and estimated cost of a
ship that will potentially meet the TOR. The
feasibility/conceptual studies performed to provide data for
the DOP may last for a part of a year. The DOP is then sent
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Organization
group, which is established for each potential ship review. So
far, this is the first round approach between operator and
designer. Here, the author would like to define the
"characteristics" of a ship. The characteristics of a ship are
the ship's properties which include physical properties like
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displacement and length, payload items like weapons,
ammunition radars, etc., and performance requirements like
endurance, speed, and seaworthiness. All those properties are
of much concern for a ship's capability to carry out her
missions. Figure 6 shows the dialogue between OPNAV and NAVSEA
to finalize the characteristics of the project ship and its
cost to help the ultimate customer (CNO) decide what the Navy
will buy. There are many parameters that influence the
performance and characteristics of the ship and its cost
accordingly. Under CNO there is a Ship Characteristics and
Improvement Board (SCIB), with the help of a working group to
review this critical matter and make appropriate decisions in
good times so as to facilitate the smooth flow of the process.
Figure 7 shows ship characteristic chain of command and
permanent members of the Board.
The Contract Design is primarily concerned with a
"Conceptual" definition of the ship-manifest in the ship
specification and contract design drawings, the principle
product of this phase to enable bids on the construction of
the ship.
Figure 6 is actually a design process in the Ship
Acquisition Program. It shows the importance of the design
efforts in the whole program. The final result, Contract
Design is the legal document for bidding and final ship
contract.
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Figure 6. Operator/Designer Dialogue
The U.S. Navy is the biggest Navy in the world. They need
many types of ships for deploying over the oceans. Other
countries with small navies have to simplify the process to
suit their own environmental conditions. Though it is complex
and lengthy, the philosophy and orderly sequence is very
instructive, and the timely concerted efforts of various
involved personnel in the schedule is also important.
Table II [Ref. 12:p. 23] shows a Ship System Design, which
summarizes the objectives, products and process of three
design phases in a tabular form. Section C of Table III shows
a Typical Destroyer Design which shows the historical
information of the typical project. Though the two figures are
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TABLE iI. SHIP SYSTEM DESIGN
OBJECTIVES
C FEASIBILITY a- to define a series of feasible ships. with associated production costs, which meet.
.0 STUDIES or approach, initialperformance requirements
'N b- to achieve a balance between operational requirements (based on companion
C military effectiveness studies) and production costs (i.e.. to determine most
E operationally costeffective alternative)
P c- to select, from the alternatives defined, a ship for Conceptual Design ("Concept
T Selection")
tU" d- to assure definition of alternative ships to the level required for a Class E
A (Class F for less reliable results) cost estimate
L e- to identify the major technical risks associated with alternative ships
p CONCEPTUAL a- to provide a technical baseline (Conceptual Baseline (CBL)) for DSARC I for new
H DESIGN major combatant or developmental designs
A b- to assure definition of the ship to the level required for a Class D cost estimate
S (provides a basis for setting a design-to-cost goal by OPNAV)
E c- validation of feasibility study results - provision of a firm baseline for
initiation of Preliminary Design (size. weight and cost should only be 'reduced"
in Preliminary and Contract Designs)
d- initial resolution of major technical risks identified in the Feasibility Studies
PRELIMINARY a- to provide a technical baseline (Functional Baseline (FBL) for DSARC I or II
DESIGN b- to assure definition of the ship to the level required for a Class C cost estimate
(lowest budget quality estimate)
c- to achieve a complete engineering description of an integrated ship system such
that the basic ship size and definition will not change during Contract Design
d- to achieve functional definition of integrated subsystems selected for optimization
of total ship performance and cost
e- to select final design criteria for whole ship entity characteristics such as noise
and ship protection consistent with cost and performance optimization of the total
ship
CONTRACT a- to provide a technical/contractual baseline (Allocated Baseline (ABL)) suitable
DESIGN for DSARC II or III
b- to assure definition of the ship to the level required for a Class B and/or
Class A cost estimate (validation of "design-to-cost")
c- complete translation of the FBL "engineering" definition of the ship to a
contractual "biddable package"
d- general validation of FBL ship system and subsystems through increased level of
definition
K.B. Spauling. and A.1. Johnson, 'Management of Ship Design at ihc Ship Enginnering center.- 12 Annual
Symposium
The description in the "objective column" is the assured
definition of ship design that should meet specific




C FEASIBILITY a- -concept selection"
6 STUDIES b- Class E or F cost estimate
N c- definition of payload
C d- synthesis model weight (1 digit level) space allocations (developedby hand
E if synthesis model not available
P e- general arrangements drawings (if a "hand study')
T f- complement (officers. CPOs and enlisted)
U g- type of machinery and number of propellers
A h- speed
L i- installed electric power
j- general ship geometry including total ship volume and area estimatesP
H Above items are included in the Feasibility Study Report
A
S CONCEPTUAL a- Class D cost estimate
E DESIGN b- draft TLR
c- Conceptual Baseline (CBL) Package
1. design rationale
2. general arrangement drawings
3. weight estimate at 3 digit level
4. body plan
5. transverse and damage stability seakeeping analysis
6. speed/power curve
7. structural midship section (optimal)
8. tentative combat system block diagram
9. preliminary weapons equipment list
10. manning list
11. preliminary master equipment list
12. propulsion/propeller analysis
13. preliminary machinery arrangement
14. power analysis and tentative generator selection
15. auxiliary machinery analysis
16. preliminary electronics space and topside arrangements
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PRODUCTS




2. Combat System Management Plan
3. Hand Based Test Site Management Plan (if required)
4. T&EMaster Plan
d- FBL Package
1. Master Equipmient List (MEL)
2. Preliminary Ship Manning Document
3. Noise Evaluation and Ship Protection Analysis
4. RMA Analysis







12, Resistance/Seakeeping/Maneuvering Analysis & Model Tests
13. Propulsion System Analysis
1,4. Electrical System Analysis
15. Machinery & Auxiliary Arrangements
16. Preliminary descriptive system analysis
17. HVAC Requirements & Diagrammatics
18. Deck & Weapons Systems Analyses & Drawings
19. Ship Control Analysis
20, Combat Data Document
21. Combat System Block Diagrams
22. Combat System Description
23. Combat System Space Arrangements
24, IC. Navigation, Radar, IFF & Sonar Analysis
25. Antenna Arrangements & topside Design Performance Assessment
26. External Communications & Command and Control Description
CONTRACT a- Class B and/or Class A cost estimate
DESIGN b- Ship Specification
c- Planning Documents for Detail Design & Construction Phase (further
developments of plans listed under Preliminary Design Products
d- ABL Package (Contract. Contract Guidance and Study Drawings with Selected
studies and guidance documents) - Consists generally of updates and further
developments of preliminary design products with the addition of 30-40 drawings
and system diagrams and several studies which provide more detailed definition of
subsystems
e- -Backups' analytical studies - not provided to shipbuilder
f- GFE procurement specifications
g- GFI requirements definition
h- Contract Data Requirements Package
i- Preliminary Operational Stations Booklet
j- Mock-ups
Spauling, op. cit.
The description in the "products column" is the result of
a designing team's effort in producing the appropriate
technical documents or drawings which are sufficient to verify
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the quantity and quality of the design and the accuracy of the
estimated cost of that-phase.
PROCESS
C FEASIBILITY a,- small group effort (3-4) people
0 STUDIES b- synthesis model (50-300 ships) or "hand" (2-30 ships) analysis (5% accuracy on
N ship weights)
C c- cost program operates on synthesis on hand study outputs
E d- general arrangements drawings developed with hand studies
P e- performance interns of speed. endurance.major payload items and special features
T (side protections, etc.)
U f- relative accuracy and consistency vs. "absolute" nature of results is stressed
A g- for non state-of-the-art designs. basic design methodology must be developed
L prior to that of Feasibility Studies
p CONCEPTUAL a- "team effort" (15-25 people)
H DESIGN b- continual interaction with TLR development (military effectiveness studies in
A parallel
S c- ship sized on an "absolute" basis vs. "relative" basis in Feasibility Studies
E d- major subsystems trade-offs
e- development of credible space/weight budget
f- emphasis on resolution of major technical risks
PRELIMINARY a- Major effort (60 men (NAVSEC only) S2-3 m)












- Weapons & Sensors
- Antennas & Topside Design Performance
2. Ship Entity Characteristics
- Noise and Vibration
- Ship Protection
-ILS/RMA
c- Intensive ship system level integration/optimization analysts
d- Focus on TLS development
e- Combat systems integration with ship system




CONTRACT a- major effort (120 men - NAVSEC - S7 m+)
DESIGN b- emphasison:
1. preparation of ship specifications
2.,CDRL package, preparation
3. contractibility and producibility of ABL package
4. GFE/GFI definition
c- detailed subsystem/equipment definition
d- final system performance validation by model tests
e- detailed space layouts
f- mock-up evaluation of such spaces as bridge and office complex
g- intensive final package review and adjudication effort
h- formal configuration control
5pauling, op. cit.
The description in the "process column" is for general
guidance only to show average manpower needed for each design
phase, special attention to be given to the floor area, volume
and weight of the design. Furthermore, it shows the importance
of individual interface and integration when dealing with
design-to-cost and trade-of-analysis.
D. DESIGN CAPABILITY, THE KEY FACTOR IN SHIP ACQUISITION
PROCESS
Referring to the development of the United States Foreign
Military Sales Program and its principle objectives, it is
quite clear that arms transfer can also be a form of transfer
of technology that will enable the receiving country to build
at home. For the benefit of both countries, requests for
technology transfer should be granted as long as the receiving
country can assure the commitment of a progressively large
share of defense budget funds without undue burden to their
economies and the project is to the interest of the U.S. and
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global security. Furthermore, according to Section 38 of AECA
as amended, there is no dollar limit on commercial sales.
Since the R.O.C. government in Taiwan is facing certain
difficulties in the international community and is unable to
purchase naval vessels elsewhere, technical assistance from
the United States is of prime importance for an indigenous
naval ship building program. Since Taiwan's military forces
have been girded to the American hardware system for almost
half the century, it is rather natural that "Buy American" is
the first thought in the R.O.C. Unless America is reluctant to
supply somcthing, "Buy American" is the R.O.C.'s military
purchasing policy to get the most rational use of American
industrial, economic and technological resources, to achieve
the greatest attainable military capability at the most
reasonable cost, greater standardization and inter-operability
of the weapon systems. Because it would be too costly to
change the military system, needed equipment such as main
engines, various auxiliaries and spare parts, etc., must be
purchased from the United States. The cost reimbursed can in
turn counter-balance some of the trade deficit between the
United States and R.O.C. Hence, it can be concluded that the
effective implementation of this policy would benefit both
countries economically and militarily.
The ship building process as a whole consists of design and
construction. Ship design is deemed the upper stream job while
construction lies in the down stream. In other words, design
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is the root of the shipbuilding industry. Without a design
capabil'ity shipbuilding is only a rootless industry. By this
token, the R.O.C. Navy should begin to cultivate with great
effort a naval ship design capability.
Referring to the on-going R.O.C. Navy PFG Construction
program, the design was purchased through TDP of U.S.F.M.S.
The construction in CSBC is technically cooperated with BIW.
Purchasing an existing design is a kind of technology
transfer, but it leaves one wondering whether it includes the
"know-how" or not. As has been mentioned before, the design is
a factor of paramount importance in the ship acquisition
process. Usually, the ship design was done by the "in-house"
organization of the U.S. Navy before Contract. Only when there
are many projects and the ship design workload is beyond the
capacity of the "in-house" design organization, does the
Preliminary and Contract Design or Contract Design alone
transfer to the private design company. Upon award of the
shipbuilding contract the shipbuilder has to carry on the
detail design for the construction.
Ship design is labor extensive in engineering efforts. An
average Preliminary Design now uses 30,000 man-days and an
Average Contract Design uses 50,000 man-days of engineering
[Ref. 12: p. 105]. As to the design duration of various
phases, Dr. Johnson refers to "Ship Design Project Histories"
of NAVSEC Document 6110 (Naval Ship Engineering Center,
NAVSEC, which was created in 1966 and was merged in 1979 into
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Naval Sea Systems Coamand, NAVSEA) and stated in his paper for
the FFG-7 class. The author would like to summarize the
important figures regarding the FFG design in the paper and
the document in Table III for reference.
The historical information should be a useful reference
document for all those involved in small warship procurement
process. They have obviously spent a great deal of time in
putting together a considerable amount of information. This
information shall be of invaluable resource for comparison and
analysis, planning, programming, budgeting and controlling of
new ship designs for N.S.D.C. and the newly established Navy
Ship Acquisition Management Office (NASANO) in R.O.C. Navy,
Generally speaking, vessels designed and built by the
United States are too large and expensive to be suitable for
other navies. FFG-7 Oliver Hazzard Perry Class frigate are at
the bottom end of the U.S. Navy's inventory of warships in
both size and cost. Though is it suitable for the R.O.C. Navy,
the original weapon systems may not be available for whatever
the reasons. Therefore, changes have to be made to suit
whichever systems they can get. Hence, modifications or
alterations of the original purchased design become an urgent
problem.
For the above case, either ROC Navy or CSBC may have to
arrange a special agreement asking the original design
organization for assistance to solve this particular design
problem. This difficulty clearly shows that transferring only
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TABLE V. PATROL FREIGHT (PF) SHIP DESIGN SUMMARIES-
A. Special Factors About This Project:
1 FFG-7 is a high priority program. The Navy urgently
wants to replace the World War II hulls which had to be
retired.
2. OPNAV directed that the ship be limited to 3,400
tons and $45 million ship cost, which caused the FFG-7 to
be the first "Design-to-Cost" ship.
3. About 20-30 person Technical and Management Project
Team was assembled to run the program in NAVSEC for a
tight schedule (23 months to complete Preliminary and
Contract Design).
B. Various Statistics in Three Design Phases
Design Phase Feasibility/ Preliminary Contract
Concept Design Design
Design Cost $193,000 $2,982,400 $6,759,100
(Jan. 1975)







Design not available 25,000 51,000
Man-Days
Documents
Studies/ 1 68 196
Reports
Drawings 6 47 142
Specifications 1 (TLR) 1 (TLR) 1 (ship
specifi-
cation)
Model Tests 0 8 28
Design 3 24 30
Briefings
Planning/ 1 11 52
Management
Design 30 79 66
Notebooks
TOTAL 42 238 515
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-the construction technology is not enough to satisfy the need.
Measures should be taken for transferring the design
technology not only for the on-going construction but also for
later follow ships and future projects. Now is the appropriate




1. Arrange the original PFG design organization to send
an engineering team to Taiwan to perform the drawing
modification. NSDC should select their designers to
work with the team. The best way to transfer the
technology is through people and to work together on
the job.
2. Recruit more personnel with technical backgrounds to
join the NSDC functional organizations and arrange
necessary training to enhance the design capacity.
NSDC should have suitable designers to handle one
ship project of PFG size.
3. Taiwan should have a suitable hydrodynamic laboratory
for model tests and R&D.
4. NSDC should arrange technical cooperation with a
reputable American private design company to improve
the design capability.
5. Set up a computer center and technical library in
NSDC to form a technical information center.
R.O.c. should fully utilize the techniques transfer to
accumulate experience, cultivate man power, set up systems
(management/logistics/operations) and further upgrade our own
warship design capabilities and shipbuilding techniques.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The R.O.C. on Taiwan, however, is still facing a military
threat from Communist China. The United States has adopted a
two-track China policy since 1978, maintaining trade and
cultural ties with the people on Taiwan while improving its
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relations with the Communist China. But the United States has
made commitments to the R.O.C. in accordance with the Taiwan
Relation Act, and those commitments are closely linked to the
vital interests in that area and the interests of the United
States.
At present, the U.S. policy on arms sales to the R.O.C.
remains ambiguous. In many cases, Washington has denied the
R.O.C.'s request for sophisticated fighters and other
necessary weapons for defense purposes. Given the U.S. policy
of keeping military balance in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S.
should adequately provide the R.O.C. with defensive weapons to
maintain the stability and prosperity of the Republic of China
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